dissabte, 31 de desembre de 2011

FELIÇ 2012 // HAPPY 2012



BLAU NAVAL US DESITJA UN BON ANY NOU!
 

BLAU NAVAL WISHES YOU A HAPPY NEW YEAR!

* PACIFIC OCEAN (June 6, 2011) An F/A-18C Hornet assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 113 breaks the sound barrier during an air power demonstration over the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Carl Vinson and Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 are currently underway in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Travis K. Mendoza/Released)


DSME to build three submarines for Indonesian Navy*



The Indonesian Navy has awarded a contract to Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) to build three submarines in a move to modernise its capabilities in line with other countries across the Asia-Pacific region.

Under the $1.07bn order, DSME will build and deliver three 1,400t customised versions of the Type 209-class vessel for the Indonesian Navy.

The agreement to acquire additional submarines is part of the Indonesian Government's 2024 Defence Strategic Plan, according to which the navy will be equipped with ten submarines representing the minimum required essential force.

DSME will construct two submarines in South Korea in partnership with shipbuilder PT PAL and the third submarine will be constructed at PT PAL's facilities in Surabaya, Indonesia.

The new vessels will be added to the existing Indonesian fleet of submarines, the KRI Cakra and KRI Nenggala.

The 61.3m-long Chang Bogo-class Type 209 is a diesel-electric attack submarine equipped with eight weapon tubes for torpedoes and other weapons, and can accommodate a crew of 40.

The Type 209 submarine was first developed by Germany in the early 1970s and Korea bought the technology licence to produce it in the beginning stage.

The submarine incorporates four 120-cell batteries, two main ballast tanks, aft trim tanks, and is powered by four MTU diesels and four AEG generators, attached directly to a five or seven-bladed propeller.

Construction on the submarines is expected to begin in January 2012 and be complete by the first half of 2018.

DSME competed against manufacturers from France, Russia and Germany for the Indonesian Navy contract.

* Notícia publicada a Naval Technology. Corea del Sud fa temps que va adquirir la llicència per construïr submarins alemanys de la classe 209, fet que ara ha aprofitat per exportar. Un exemple sobre com rendibilitzar inversions.

divendres, 30 de desembre de 2011

Strait of Hormuz standoff: Iran films US aircraft carrier*


The commander of Iran's navy said the reconnaissance mission was proof that his fleet had "control over the moves by foreign forces" but it was unclear what intelligence could be derived from the grainy video, which was played triumphantly on state television.
Admiral Habibollah Sayyari's statement came as Iranian ships, helicopters and submarines continued a 10-day war game exercise designed to give credibility to the country's threat to close the Strait and choke off the world's oil supplies if the West moves ahead with sanctions.
The drill is underway in international waters near the Strait and only a few hundred miles from America's Bahrain-based Fifth Fleet. The US Navy has vowed to prevent any closure of the channel, through which 15 million barrels of oil pass every day.
A Navy spokeswoman would not comment on the footage but confirmed that the USS John C Stennis, one of the fleet's largest carriers, was on a "routine transit" through the Strait to provide support to Nato forces in Afghanistan.
Despite the Fifth Fleet's advantage in firepower, a senior Revolutionary Guard commander vowed yesterday that "Any threat will be responded [to] by threat."

"We will not relinquish our strategic moves if Iran's vital interests are undermined by any means," General Hossein Salami told Press TV.

This afternoon, the US also announced it was selling more than 80 F-15 strike aircraft to Saudi Arabia, an American ally and Iran's main rival for military dominance in the Middle East. Without specifically naming Iran, the State Department said the sale was intended as "a strong message to countries in the region that the United States is committed to stability in the Gulf and broader Middle East."

Barry Pavel, Director of the Brent Scowcroft Centre on International Security at the Atlantic Council, said that Iran's navy was potentially capable of closing the Strait but would be unlikely to do so because of the country's dependence on revenues from oil exports. "It would have to be a very extreme situation for Iran to basically shut down its own economy," he said.

The Iranian threat to close the narrow shipping lane was made after the EU, backed by the US, announced it was tightening sanctions on Iran for pressing ahead with its nuclear programme. Europe buys around 20 per cent of all Iranian oil exports and a full embargo would cause serious damage to Iran's economy.

* Notícia publicada al Telegraph. No sabem fins a quin punt el "shadowing" realitzat per l'Iran és realment efectiu en termes d'obtenció d'intel·ligència. No obstant, Teheran no es limita només a la retòrica contra els Estats Units. Cal no perdre de vista cap dels moviments d'aquest règim teocràtic.

dijous, 29 de desembre de 2011

Russian nuclear sub 'ready' for India transfer*



Russia’s Nerpa nuclear submarine has finished sea trials and is now ready to be leased to the Indian navy in the next few days, an engineer said on Wednesday.

“The submarine is now fully ready to carry out its tasks,” a senior executive at the Amur Shipyard, where the submarine was built, told RIA Novosti. “It will be handed over before the end of the year.”

When Russia makes the delivery, it will make India only the sixth operator of nuclear submarines in the world. Earlier this month, it launched the first of its own nuclear submarines.

The ten-year lease is worth $920 milion.

The Nerpa, an Akula II-class attack submarine, had originally been scheduled for delivery in 2008 but an accident earlier that year forced the Russian authorities to put it on hold.

Twenty people, mostly civilians, were killed when a fire-suppressant gas was released on the Nerpa during shakedown trials, in one of Russia’s worst naval accidents.



* Notícia publicada al RIA Novosti. La compartim per complementar les darreres notícies sobre els acords en matèria naval entre Rússis i l'Índia

dimecres, 28 de desembre de 2011

La crisi dels míssils de Síria (III)*

Analitzem en aquest article la crisi siriana a nivell operatiu/tàctic. En aquest però, plantejarem una hipòtesi sobre la conducció de les primeres fases de les operacions. És per això que a diferència dels anteriors articles no destinarem un apartat per cadascun dels estats implicats, sinó que seguirem una línia cronològica

Intel•ligència

Abans d'iniciar-se els atacs, és evident que cal haver realitzat una minuciosa tasca d'intel•ligència. Creiem que Turquia, mitjançant forces especials així com desertors sirians, ha de disposar d'una idea general bastant acurada de l'ordre de batalla d'Al-Assad. Des del mar, de ben segur que un o més submarins de la US Navy informen detalladament de les entrades i sortides dels ports de Latakia i Tartus. També hi hauríem d'afegir els omnipresents UAV, en aquest cas els RQ-4B que podrien estar operant des de la base britànica a Xipre. En cas d'haver-hi algun portaavions nordamericà a la zona, els avions radar E-2D ja deuen estar escanejant l'espai aeri sirià des d'una distància prudencial. La combinació dels Global Hawk i Hawkeyes és imprescindible, no només per saber la situació i moviments de les unitats sobre el terreny, també són uns excel•lents vectors per interceptar les comunicacions. Però d'això en parlarem més endavant. No ens hem de descuidar tampoc de la vigilància des dels satèl•lits, que aporten una imatgeria molt detallada i en temps real. Finalment, hi hauríem d'afegir les accions realitzades des del ciberespai. No tenim cap dubte que les unitats de ciberguerra nordamericanes i israelianes deuen estar cercant escletxes als servidors informàtics de l'estat baasista.

Amb totes aquestes dades, la coalició que iniciï la intervenció contra Síria pot tenir una monitorització més que satisfactòria. A partir d'aquí, es poden iniciar les accions d'atac sense que en cap moment es descuidin les tasques d'intel•ligència.


Neutralització dels P-800


Com hem dit, els Yakhont són uns míssils extremadament ràpids (uns 1000 m/s) i amb un abast de fins a 300 km. Cal neutralitzar-los si és que es vol aproximar un Carrier Strike Group a la costa siriana. Malgrat que el nombre de míssils (72) sigui bastant elevat, estan repartits en només dues bateries "Bastion" K-300P. Per tant, l'objectiu primari han de ser els vehicles de comandament, control i comunicacions d'aquestes. El secundari, òbviament, la destrucció de la totalitat dels míssils. Malgrat que no siguin impossibles de camuflar, han d'estar situades en les proximitats de la costa, així com en zones que disposin de bones connexions viàries a causa de les grans dimensions dels vehicles que conformen aquestes unitats. Però l'element que les fa més vulnerables és la necessitat de vectors que els hi facilitin la informació dels objectius. Com hem dit en vàries ocasions, aquí és on entren les naus russes. Per descomptat que la US Navy se'n guardarà prou d'atacar-les, però pot interrompre perfectament les comunicacions, així com "encegar" els radars. A part dels Hawkeye, cada Carrier Air Wing incorpora un Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ), equipats aparells EF-18G Growler, la versió de guerra electrònica del F/A-18 Hornet.

Així doncs, una sobtada interrupció de les comunicacions entre les unitats de superfície russes i les bateries sirianes, acompanyada de "neu" i distorsions a les pantalles de radar, podria ser el senyal que les hostilitats han començat. Però el "pagament en efectiu", emprant l'expressió de Von Clausewitz, creiem que es realitzarà des de submarins, tot llançant míssils de creuer. Combinant l'enorme abast dels Tomahawk, amb les darreres millores incorporades per poder atacar objectius mòbils, no creiem que els míssils P-800 sirians tinguin gaires opcions d'escapar.


Zona d'exclusió aèria


Si la intervenció segueix els paràmetres del conflicte de Líbia, caldrà establir una zona d'exclusió aèria per tal que les forces de l'Exèrcit Sirià Lliure puguin consolidar posicions, així com rebre subministraments. El camí per aconseguir això va per dues vies paral•leles: supressió de les defenses antiaèries enemigues ( SEAD, de les sigles en anglès) i eliminació de les forces aèries. En aquest cas, creiem que l'atac a distància amb míssils de creuer tornarà a ser la via escollida. Ara bé, els SSN nord-americans ja no podran participar en aquesta fase, doncs cadascun d'ells només porta 12 Tomahawks en cel•les de llançament vertical. Caldrà combinar els SSGN, amb 154 Tomahawks cadascun i unitats de superfície ( destructors Arleigh Burke i creuers Ticonderoga). Els SAM més avançats de que disposa l'estat sirià són els S-300P i per tant, el primer objectiu a eliminar. Malgrat que Al-Assad disposa de més sistemes de defensa antiaèria, la majoria són tecnologia de l'antiga URSS. Tal com es va demostrar a la operació Desert Storm, aquests poden ser interferits. Recordem que en aquella ocasió, cap dels grups de bombarders acompanyats per avions EF-111 Raven o EA-6G Prowler va patir baixes. En el cas dels EF-18G, incorporen contramesures electròniques millors encara dels que hem esmentat...


Respecte a l'eliminació de les forces aèries sirianes, no serà caçar "sitting ducks", malgrat la superioritat tecnològica i d'entrenament de l'aviació naval nord-americana. Els principals aparells a neutralitzar són, per aquest ordre: MiG-29, Su-24 i MiG-25. El MiG-29 "Fulcrum", tot i que no entrarem en detalls, és un dels millors dissenys de caça polivalent de l'era soviètica. Aquí però, volem destacar una característica poc coneguda. Aquests aparells poden envolar-se des de pistes semi-improvisades, gràcies als seus inductors d'aire alternatius, situats a les extensions de les vores d'atac, entre el fuselatge i les ales. Aquest sistema evita que entrin objectes estranys ( pedres, terra, trossos de pneumàtic...) que podrien danyar el reactor. Aquest fet no és casual, i menys al Pròxim Orient. Una de les claus del triomf de l'operació Focus (1967), va ser la inutilització de les pistes per part de la IAF. Això mantingué l'aviació àrab literalment "clavada" a terra, on esdevingué una presa fàcil. No cal dir doncs, que la URSS en prengué nota. És per això que els Fulcrum, tan per la seva capacitat de mantenir-se operatius en condicions adverses, com per les seves excel•lents qualitats de combat, han de ser eliminats ràpidament. En segon lloc venen els Su-24 "Fencer". Tot i no tenir el "glamour" dels caces de superioritat aèria, aquests avions d'atac són quelcom molt seriós. Foren pensats per realitzar atacs de precisió a baixa cota i alta velocitat. Tenen un radi d'acció de més de 600 km volant a ran de terra en tot moment, i emprant els míssils Kh-58 (160 km d'abast i velocitat Mach 3.6 ) és converteixen una amenaça que cal neutralitzar. Finalment trobem els interceptors MiG-25 "Foxbat". Malgrat ser uns aparells que no són ja una amenaça, el seu rol secundari de reconeixement tàctic fa que se'ls hagi de considerar. Tal com plantejàvem més amunt, l'atac contra les forces d'Al-Assad comporta eliminar o inutilitzar qualsevol vector d'obtenció d'informació.


Bloqueig franja litoral


Assegurat l'espai aeri, hi ha un moviment clau que l'Exèrcit Sirià Lliure ha d'executar per posar en escac al règim: controlar la sortida al mar. Certament, per unes forces tan petites i poc equipades, conquerir i controlar una franja de 160 km de costa no serà gens fàcil, però els beneficis d'aconseguir-ho poden ser enormes, especialment a nivell estratègic. El primer objectiu, per proximitat a la frontera turca ( des d'on opera l'ESL) és la ciutat portuària de Latakia. Recordem que ja va ser escenari d'enfrontaments i repressió el passat 14 d'agost, incloent-hi el bombardeig des del mar. Malgrat que els partidaris del règim siguin nombrosos, la majoria de la ciutat és sunnita, cosa que podria aplanar el camí. En aquest cas, ens inclinem per una acció combinada de comandos especials ( Navy SEAL, Shayetet 13 i SBS) per assegurar les posicions claus juntament amb els opositors locals. Paral•lelament, l'ESL pot ser assistit per equips de direcció de tir, per tal de garantir un recolzament aeri tàctic precís i eficaç. Amb Latakia a la butxaca, la balança del conflicte comença a canviar. Ara bé, encara queda prendre Tartus. Aquesta ciutat presenta l'inconvenient d'acollir una base naval russa i per tant, exigeix actuar de forma molt meditada. Una opció seria, tot mitjançant un ràpid moviment de flanqueig, l'encerclament de la ciutat. Sense necessitat d'assaltar-la i arriscar-se a una confrontació amb les forces russes, es podria mantenir aïllada fins el final del conflicte, de forma similar a com es procedí amb la ciutat de Lorient a la 2a Guerra Mundial; malgrat que les forces de la Kriegsmarine hi aguantaren fins el final del conflicte, ja no podien operar de cap manera.


Aturarem aquí el plantejament sobre la conducció d'operacions a nivell tàctic. Creiem que anar més enllà seria massa especulatiu. En qualsevol cas, en les properes setmanes anirem veient com es va descabdellant la situació. En aquesta petita sèrie d'articles, hem volgut contribuir a reflexionar-hi des d'una perspectiva que, molt a desgrat nostre es troba a faltar en els nostres mitjans de comunicació.



Pol Molas
Analista del CEEC

* Notícia publicada al lloc web del CEEC. Tot i que no tracti només d'afers navals, bona part de les operacions que s'hi analitzen hi estan vinculades.

Navy flying drone to launch from submarine's trash chute*



A backpack-size kamikaze drone ordered into combat by the U.S. Army could also soon become an aerial scout for U.S. Navy submarines hidden beneath the waves. Launching a flying robot from underwater utilizes a sneaky tactic — using a tube that normally ejects trash from a submarine. 

The Navy wants the "Switchblade" drone designed by AeroVironment to become a flying scout capable of spotting enemy ships over the horizon, even as the "mother" submarine remains hidden underwater. Its upcoming submarine launch test would coincide with the world's biggest naval war games in 2012, according to a new contract awarded to U.S. defense firm Raytheon. 

Previous tests by Raytheon in 2008 showed how submerged launch vehicles can float to the surface and launch flying drones such as the Switchblade. But those demonstrations only involved surface ships and dummy drones. 

The planned submarine launch would use the trash-disposal unit — the tube that typically ejects the trash of submarine crews — rather than one of several torpedo tubes designed to fire at enemy ships or submarines. Such a launch would take place with the submarine running just beneath the waves at periscope depth. 

The Switchblade drone was originally designed to launch from a tube set up on the ground by a U.S. Army soldier, fly around until the soldier identified an enemy, and then dive at the target with explosive results. It's unclear whether or not the Navy wants the Switchblade to keep its kamikaze capability, but the scouting role seems far more useful for a submarine that already packs plenty of explosive torpedoes and missiles. 

Any intended mission may become clearer during the Rim of the Pacific Exercise scheduled for 2012. That annual naval war game held by the U.S. and its allies in the Pacific involves plenty of opportunity for practice alongside ships ranging from carriers to destroyers and frigates. 

If successful, Switchblade would join the U.S. military's fast-growing arsenal of robots at sea. The Navy has already begun testing a stealthy X-47B drone that could someday launch in squadrons from the heaving decks of carriers, as well as a Fire-X helicopter drone aimed at special operations such as catching smugglers or pirates.

* Notícia publicada al web de MSNBC. L'evolució dels UAV també ha arribat al món dels submarins. Des d'aquells experiments de la IIGM, on es van construïr submarins amb hangars per hidroavions de reconeixement, que aquestes naus no podien disposar de reconeixement aeri tàctic propi.

dilluns, 26 de desembre de 2011

Belgrano was heading to the Falklands, secret papers reveal*







For decades debate and recrimination has raged over where the ship was heading when it was torpedoed by a Royal Navy submarine.
Britain received international criticism after the sinking after the Argentine Junta announced that the warship had been returning to its home port and was outside the 200 mile exclusion zone imposed by Whitehall.
But Major David Thorp, who spent 34 years working as a signals expert in military intelligence, has disclosed for the first time that he was asked to carry out a trawl of all the intelligence on the sinking at the direct request of Margaret Thatcher a few months after the end of the war.
He was ordered to compile a report for the Prime Minister called “The Sinking of the Belgrano” that has never been published.
From his own signals intercepts and those from other Government agencies, he proved that the Argentine cruiser was heading into the exclusion zone. 

Major Thorp was in charge of a top secret signals interception section hidden on the amphibious warship Intrepid as it steamed with the Task Force. 

Around Ascension Island, 4,000 miles from the Falklands, his team began picking up naval communications sent to the Argentine fleet which they were easily able to decipher. 

The report states that in late April 1982, they intercepted a message sent from naval headquarters ordering the Belgrano and its escorts to a grid reference within the exclusion zone and not back to base as the Argentines later claimed. 

The Belgrano was sunk by two torpedoes fired by the hunter-killer submarine Conqueror on May 2 with the loss of 323 lives a number of miles outside the exclusion zone. 

“For some reason they decided on a rendezvous point still within the exclusion zone,” Major Thorp said. “Whether they were trying to raise a thumb at us I don’t know. At the time I thought it was strange thinking why didn’t they go straight into port?” 

In his new book, The Silent Listener, Major Thorp wrote: “The findings of my final report stated the destination of the vessel was not to her home port as the Argentine Junta stated but the objective of the ship was to relocate to a prearranged RV within the exclusion zone.” 

Despite the report being read by Mrs Thatcher she never disclosed the information either in Parliament or elsewhere possibly because she did not want to reveal Britain’s eavesdropping capabilities. 

But during her infamous BBC exchange with the schoolteacher Diana Gould who confronted her on the sinking Mrs Thatcher made an intriguing reference to the report saying: "One day, all of the facts, in about 30 years time, will be published." Mrs Gould died earlier this month. 

In recent years the Argentine navy has accepted that the sinking of the Belgrano was a legitimate act of war.
In his book, that was cleared by the security services, Major Thorp also discloses for the first time how the British code-cracking operation gave the force a significant advantage. 

Shortly before the Battle of Goose Green, Lt Col “H” Jones, the commander of 2nd Bn The Parachute Regiment, boarded Intrepid after hearing about the eavesdroppers through SAS colleagues. 

“That morning we had picked up 10 grid references on intercepts and H looked at the map and realised that they were his own troops’ locations. He said “bloody hell we are sharing the same hill as the enemy.’” 

“He wanted to know the strengths and weaknesses of the Argentines, then we looked at calibre of people on ground and he came to the conclusion that perhaps 600 Paras were worth 1,500 Argentines.” 

The intelligence gave the commanding officer the “peace of mind” to start the battle that would lead in his own death, a posthumous Victoria Cross award and ultimately victory in the campaign. 

* Notícia publicada pel Telegraph. Creiem que, malgrat el temps passat, és bó que es conegui la veritat sobre l'enfonsament del Belgrano, que fou un acte de guerra perfectament legítim.

What's New About the AirSea Battle Concept?*

 
 
 
 
Four naval strategists take a look back at Navy-Air Force cooperation in the past to explain all the buzz surrounding this latest strategy.
 
The Navy-Air Force AirSea Battle Concept (ASBC), modeled after the Army-Air Force Air Land Battle Doctrine of a previous generation, has been heralded by some as the answer to compelling strategic and operational challenges facing the U.S. military today. But is this really a new strategy? And old or new, will it help the United States deal with compelling world-wide issues?
Understanding where we have been may provide insight into where we can go and what we can accomplish with this concept. It may also prepare the Navy and Air Force for some of the likely as well as unintended consequences this concept may create.
Writing in a National Defense University National War College publication in 1992, then-Commander James Stavridis stated: "We need an air sea battle concept centered on an immediately deployable, highly capable, and fully integrated force-an Integrated Strike Force."1 As this quote-by now-Admiral Stavridis, the current Supreme Allied Commander Europe-suggests, neither the term "AirSea Battle Concept" nor the concept itself is brand new. Rather, this integration of sea and air forces has roots that extend back over a half-century.

Taking to the Air Against U-Boats

The first useful example of an ASBC occurred during the Battle of the Atlantic campaign to defeat German U-boats. By January 1943, more than 100 submarines were prowling the Atlantic Ocean. Their most effective hunting ground was in the so-called "air gap" between the southern tip of Greenland and the longest range of patrol aircraft based in North America. In this area, convoys relied on their own surface escorts for protection.
Previously, Atlantic convoys had often been routed around U-boats waiting to ambush them by using intelligence based on ULTRA decrypts of intercepted German radio communications. But before the Allies could effectively pinpoint the locations of the U-boats using ULTRA, for three weeks in March 1943 wolf packs operating mostly in the air gap sank more than 20 percent of all Allied shipping plying the North Atlantic. During this same month British, Canadian, and American forces responsible for countering the U-boat threat put a plan in place to allocate a small force of very-long-range B-24 Liberator aircraft to cover the gap.
When the B-24s and aircraft from the newly assigned escort carriers started covering convoys, the advantage tipped in favor of the Allies. In May 1943, the German Navy lost 47 U-boats in the North Atlantic. When this precursory ASBC was expanded in October 1943 to include long-range Allied patrol aircraft operating from the Azores, U-boats were at greater risk over even larger areas of the Atlantic.
In this long campaign, British, Canadian, and U.S. forces considered and implemented a number of other coordinated air-sea battle tactics, including: bombing the U-boat bases on the French coast; ambushing U-boats transiting the Bay of Biscay from the air; targeting the yards where they were built; and reinforcing surface convoy escorts with land-based blimps and seaplanes.
All of these efforts were part of an extended air-sea battle of attrition, where Allied air and naval units worked together to punch through an anti-access, area-denial envelope that German naval forces tried to impose on the North Atlantic sea lanes. Over the course of that long campaign, naval and air officers developed means of cooperation and coordination-especially of air assets-that prevailed. But it is important to understand that the Navy, by itself, was able then and is capable now to conduct an air-sea battle. The salient question is, to what extent did and does cooperation either make U.S. forces more efficient or create real synergy?

Aircraft and Amphibs in the Philippines

Another useful illustration is the effective air-sea campaign waged in and around the Philippines in late 1944 by U.S. Army and Navy aircraft and Navy and Marine Corps amphibious forces. U.S carrier task forces and U.S. Army long-range, land-based air forces struck distant Japanese bases and made it difficult for the Japanese to reinforce their air assets in the Philippines. Moreover, the 7th Fleet escort carriers directly under General Douglas MacArthur's command provided fighter and attack support in a display of real integration.
The key factor-well understood by both Army and Navy planners?-was the critical role long-range, land-based aviation had in expanding the offensive air envelope under which amphibious forces operated. Accordingly, the Army and Navy assaulted the islands of Biak and Morotai before moving on to Leyte because air units flying from those islands were crucial to the penetration of Japanese defenses in the Philippines.
Thus, Navy and Army air assets complemented each other to accomplish critical operational tasks to support campaign victories in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters during World War II. The precedent had been set, crucial lessons learned, and the power and synergy of the combined land- and sea-based air forces established.

Why the AirSea Battle Concept?

Earlier this year, Todd Harrison wrote the following in The New Guns Versus Butter Debate, published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA): "The fiscal reality is that in a flat or declining budgetary environment, [the DOD] cannot continue to do both [fund personnel accounts as well as acquisition accounts] to the same extent it does today."2
Throughout the Cold War, the potential fight on the plains of Europe dominated U.S. strategic thinking. The military element of this strategy, primarily carried out by the Army and Air Force, had by the 1980s evolved into what became known as the AirLand Battle Doctrine. The doctrine led to new operational concepts that recognized an emerging threat based on Soviet numerical superiority coupled with a narrowing technological gap. A memorandum cosigned by the Army and Air Force chiefs outlined steps to achieve procurement and operational synergies to restore conventional warfighting capabilities after the Vietnam War.
But for nearly a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. military-strategic planners had little motivation to develop a broad fighting doctrine, and the services had even less incentive to collaborate.
The one notable exception to this came during Operation Desert Storm. But in that case, the opposing air and sea forces were minimal and the core doctrine only tangentially employed. By the early 1990s, analysis by the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment began to examine whether a "dramatic shift in the character of military competitions was underway." Their prescient conclusion now resonates as they highlighted the real possibility of the rise of potential challenge from a "peer competitor" (i.e., China) and a "second order challenge from a 'non-peer' competitor" (i.e., Iran).3
Pentagon strategists examining the changing nature of warfare were given new impetus by the congressionally mandated National Defense Panel (NDP) 1997 report's conclusion that "The United States 'must radically alter' the way in which its military projects power."4 However, this momentum slowed as the attacks of 9/11 dramatically changed the focus of the U.S. military to the exigencies of a war on terrorism. 

The Timeline, China, and the Economy

By the end of the first decade of the 21st century several trends converged that demanded a new focus on an ASBC. One was the Obama administration's shift in emphasis away from the war on terrorism and its decision to draw down the U.S. commitment to Iraq and Afghanistan on a finite timeline. A second was the startlingly rapid rise of China over this decade. As the head of Pacific Command, Admiral Robert Willard, has noted, "Elements of China's military modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region."5 And a third was the unanticipated economic recession faced by the United States.
On the heels of the deepest economic crisis since the 1930s, and with the federal budget deficit running in excess of $1.5 trillion in Fiscal Year 2010, the age-old "guns versus butter" debate has brought into sharper focus the consistent theme that the U.S. military may not have the strategic assets needed to deter, and if necessary prevail, against a high-end peer competitor like China. A key assumption underpinning the ASBC is that without better coordination between and among the U.S. military services, especially the Navy and the Air Force, this outcome is all but guaranteed. Moreover, the concept will have limited or no effect unless these joint air and naval planners tie actual operational requirements to specific capabilities.
Faced with a rising threat of peer and near-peer competitors with alarming anti-access/area-denial capabilities-as well as long-term budget pressures-the ASBC can be viewed as greater than an attempt to do more with less. Rather, it is a return to historical precedents when, like today, compelling strategic and operational realities forced U.S. naval and air forces to work together in a truly integrated fashion to project power against a determined foe. But a skeptic who doubts the ability of the current procurement system to respond in a meaningful way to this rising challenge may opine that the ASBC will only result in a rearrangement of existing doctrine and systems and not be a truly adaptive and dynamic approach.

Just What Is the AirSea Battle Concept?

Also earlier this year, the CSBA published Air Sea Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept, which stated: "The most important question proponents of the AirSea Battle Concept must answer is whether the concept would help to restore and sustain a stable military balance in the Western Pacific."6
At the request of Secretary of Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead and Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz directed an effort to explore how U.S air and naval forces could combine and integrate their capabilities to confront increasingly complex threats to U.S. freedom of action.7
To gain a global perspective, this joint team interviewed each U.S. combatant commander to understand the scope of threats they are likely to face over the next 10 to 20 years, particularly at the "high-end of warfare." Government officials have been keen to point out that the ASBC is not aimed at any particular country or region. But ultimately, the goal is to identify how combined Air Force and Navy capabilities can address these threats.8
After months of teasers and speculation in defense journals and conferences, the release of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provided greater clarity on the scope and raison d'être behind this concept. As part of its guidance to rebalance the force, the QDR directed the development of the air-sea battle concept to:
[Defeat] adversaries across the range of military operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities. The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains-air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace-to counter growing challenges to U.S. freedom of action.9

Protecting Power-Projection Capability

Independent analysts have been less reticent in naming specific regional adversaries. Two studies by the CSBA highlight the efforts of China and Iran as catalysts behind the concept. As the first of these studies lays out, both nations are investing in capabilities to "raise precipitously over time-and perhaps prohibitively-the cost to the United States of projecting power into two areas of vital interest: the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf."10 By adopting anti-access/area-denial capabilities, these potential adversaries seek to deny U.S forces the sanctuary of forward bases, hold aircraft carriers and their air wings at risk, and cripple U.S. battle networks. In other words, strike at the weak point of U.S. power-projection capability. To be effective, the ASBC must change that through a combination of capabilities and operational warfighting. If it doesn't, adversaries will still be able to deny access to U.S. forces.
In its second study, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, CSBA analyzes possible options to counter the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threat posed by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). First and foremost, CSBA argues, the AirSea Battle Concept should help "set the conditions" to retain a favorable military balance in the Western Pacific.11 By creating credible capabilities to defeat A2/AD threats, the United States can enhance stability in the Western Pacific and lower the possibility of escalation by deterring inclinations to challenge the United States or coerce regional allies.12
The precise nature of the ASBC will not be known until Pentagon planners complete their work. But based on the broad outlines of the CSBA's Point-of-Departure Operational Concept study, it is likely that in the initial stages of hostilities the United States would need to withstand an initial attack and limit damage to U.S. and allied forces while executing a blinding campaign against the PLA battle networks. However, the need to withstand an initial attack is a potential flaw in the CSBA plan. Prudence and technical reality would suggest that the ASBC should find a way to make U.S. forces less visible and targetable while retaining the ability to be forward with credible combat power. Being less visible and targetable raises the risk of initiating a first strike and contributes to deterring a potential foe.
Failing deterrence, the ASBC assumes that a conflict with China would involve a protracted campaign where U.S-led forces would then sustain and exploit the initiative in various domains, conduct distant blockade operations against ships bound for China, maintain operational logistics, and ramp up industrial production of needed hardware, especially precision-guided munitions. However, it is important to note that in a shorter (and perhaps more likely) conflict, blockade, logistics, and procurement will have minimal impact on the outcome.

The Strategy

But it is the ways Navy and Air Force assets would provide mutual support in this campaign that can make the ASBC, if it evolves in a manner that many strategic thinkers believe it should, a modern-day equivalent of some of the innovative strategies and tactics employed by U.S. air and sea forces in World War II. If the ASBC evolves as the CSBA study suggests, Navy and Air Force planners may evolve a strategy in which:
  • Air Force counter-space operations would blind PLA space-based ocean surveillance systems to prevent the PLA from targeting Navy surface assets, providing the Navy with operational freedom of maneuver.
  • Navy Aegis ships would supplement other missile-defense assets in Air Force forward bases in the Western Pacific.
  • Long-range penetrating strike operations would destroy PLA ground-based, long-range maritime surveillance systems and long-range ballistic-missile launchers to expand the Navy's freedom of maneuver and reduce strikes on U.S. and allied bases. Concurrently, Navy submarine-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike support against PLA integrated air defense systems would pave the way for Air Force strikes.
  • Navy carrier-based fighters' progressive rollback of PLA manned and unmanned airborne ISR platforms and fighters would secure the forward operation of Air Force tankers and other support aircraft. This would require the Navy to rethink its current inventory of missiles, jammers, and decoys.
  • Air Force aircraft would support the antisubmarine warfare campaign through offensive mining by stealthy bombers and persistent non-stealthy bomber strike support of Navy ships conducting distant blockade operations.13
The evidence also suggests that this ASBC will, indeed, gain traction throughout the U.S. military. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen has already put his imprint on the concept. Speaking at the U.S. Air Force Academy graduation and commissioning ceremony earlier this year he noted, "[The ASBC] is a prime example of how we need to keep breaking down stovepipes between services, between federal agencies, and even between nations."14

Implications of an Evolving Concept

According to CSBA's study, AirSea Battle: A Point-of- Departure Operational Concept, "The Defense Department's Program of Record forces and current concepts of operations do not accord sufficient weight to the capabilities needed to successfully execute an AirSea Battle campaign."15
However the elements outlined here combine to form a coherent ASBC, myriad strategic, institutional, and programmatic implications, both understood and unintentional, will arise. These will vary depending on the concepts envisioned and the course adopted. A sampling of a few that may immediately surface include:
Naming Names-U.S. policy toward China has been centered on managing the "peaceful rise" of this emerging peer competitor across a broad range of issues. Moreover, the United States has been careful not to paint China as a threat or engage in activities that could lead to an arms race. This may be changing, and the development of the ASBC may contribute to this change.
By actively and publicly planning, training, and equipping a joint air-sea force to confront even something as benignly described as a "pacing threat," the United States is implicitly challenging China's military influence in Asia. It is one thing for the independent thinkers at CSBA to issue a set of reports and conceptual papers on the ASBC; it is quite another for Navy and Air Force staffs to collaborate on a comprehensive approach to counter PLA systems, doctrine, and operational plans.
Reassurance-A growing perception on the part of U.S. allies and potential partners in the region is that American naval and air forces have not kept pace with expanding Chinese military capabilities.
The premise of the ASBC in fact rests on this trend. With this perception, countries have started to rethink their political, economic, and military strategies to ensure their continued security and independence as U.S. will, capacity, and capability wane. A serious, sustained commitment to ASBC will reinforce credible U.S. combat power and will assuage and persuade both friend and foe of America's commitment to the region. However, failure to fully embrace and enact the ASBC could have opposite and unforeseeable strategic consequences.
Dispersed Basing-A critical implied task in articulating the operational construct of the ASBC will be to find ways to reduce risk to both land and sea air bases, to minimize the impact of early salvo strikes, and to persist in any protracted war longer than a couple of weeks. Beyond extensive hardening and rapid runway repair, dispersal may emerge as an effective operational approach likely to be considered.
But dispersal is not without its challenges. Domestic political objections in countries where the United States will desire multiple basing options, including the creative approaches of the Cold War such as highway-runways and concealed operating bases for vertical short-takeoff and landing aircraft, will be high. Even in countries where the United States currently has basing rights, such as Japan, the political challenges will be immense. Moreover, countries that sign on to this plan know they are certain targets and may calculate that the costs of allowing this basing plan outweigh the benefits. And to be truly effective, maintenance, logistics, and personnel must be made mobile to support this scheme, which rapidly becomes a very expensive approach that might best be tackled another way.
Beyond Purple to Cobalt Blue-Another key to the success of the ASBC will be institutionalizing a close collaborative relationship between the Navy and Air Force beyond the initial exhilaration of the ASBC's maiden release. The model for this is the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act that forced cooperation among all the services using clear incentives tied to promotion of the officer corps. For the ASBC to sustain a protracted pattern of cooperation, an institutionalized cadre of officers, planners, and procurement specialists must be put in place. Otherwise, the services will fall back into their familiar patterns of competition.
Where the Family Shops-It is too early to tell what impact the ASBC will have on procurement and the focus of the industrial base. If the plan calls for a refinement of legacy systems, then the impact could be light. But if the ASBC introduces a radical approach, the impact could be quite large, even if this change is more evolutionary than revolutionary. This would be good news for some and troubling news for others.
The ASBC is as much about developing credible combat power and the military doctrine to support it as it is about long-term competition. Thus, any concept must analyze the holistic impact and strategic costs to sustain and win the long-term competition with any peer or near-peer state. While the adjustments to doctrine, operational plans, and system acquisition resulting from the ASBC are yet unknown, ultimately the ASBC must be more than simply a sharing of assets or cooperation for its own sake. It must integrate some unique set of capabilities from both services to create real synergistic effects that neither service can accomplish individually. 


1. CDR James Stavridis, USN, A New Air Sea Battle Concept: Integrated Strike Forces (Washington D.C.: National Defense University National War College, 1992), p. 3.
2. Todd Harrison, The New Guns Versus Butter Debate, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), p.10.
3. Andrew Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), p. 8.
4. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), pp. 12-13.
5. ADM Robert Willard, prepared statement before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, 23 March 2010.
6. Jan Van Tol, et. al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2010), p. 95.
7. Christopher Cavas, "USAF, U.S. Navy to Expand Cooperation," Defense News, 9 November 2009. See also: Andrew Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle?, p. 1.
8. Cavas, "USAF, U.S. Navy to Expand Cooperation."
9. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010), p. 55.
10. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle?, p. 7.
11. Van Tol, et. al., Battle: A Point of Departure Operational Concept, p. ix.
12. Ibid., p. 18.
13. Ibid., p. 95.
14. Donna Miles, "Defense Leaders Laud Air-Sea Battle Concept Initiative," American Forces Press Service, 7 June 2010.
15. Van Tol, et. al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, p. 81.
Mr. Carreno is the head of the Strategic and Business Planning Branch at SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific, and has written previously for Proceedings.
Professor Culora is the chairman of the Warfare Analysis and Research Department at the Naval War College. He is a retired Navy captain who commanded both HSL-47 and the USS Boxer (LHD-4) and was a fellow at both Harvard University and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.
Captain Galdorisi is director of the Corporate Strategy Group at SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific. His latest book is Leave No Man Behind: the Saga of Combat Search and Rescue (MBI Publishing Co., 2009).
Mr. Hone is a former special assistant to the commander of the Naval Air Systems Command, co-author of American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919-1941 (Naval Institute Press, 1999), and a professor at the Naval War College.

AirSea Battle Concept Fundamentals

  • Omnipresent unmanned combat air systems to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
  • Full development of unmanned underwater vehicles and other persistent unmanned underwater systems
  • Configuration, load out, or perhaps even saliency of Nimitz/Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in this particular context
  • Rethinking of the size and structure of the amphibious force (despite their current role in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief)
  • Increased, sustainable, and survivable aerial refueling capacity if the need for persistent manned aircraft is still deemed critical
  • Significant increase in long-range ISR assets like Global Hawk, with increased range and sensors
  • Less emphasis on short-range Navy fighters (Super Hornets and Joint Strike Fighters)
  • A radical new look at mission modules for the Littoral Combat Ship (decoy, deception)
  • Potential capping or slight drawdown of special operations forces
  • Increased emphasis on submerged precision strike (more nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGN) conversions or SSGN follow-on)
  • Increased emphasis on Electronic Warfare
  • A geographic shift to the "One Hub" posture of the Center for Naval Analyses Tipping Point paper
  • A joining of 10th Fleet and the 24th Air Force to address joint cyber and command-and-control issues

* Article publicat al Proceedings Magazine del US Naval Institute, l'agost del 2010. Creiem que per la seves reflexions és d'un alt interés per totes aquelles persones interessades en les operacions combinades de forces navals i aviació.

diumenge, 25 de desembre de 2011

BON NADAL // MERRY CHRISTMAS



BLAU NAVAL ESPERA QUE EL TIÓ US HAGI PORTAT ALLÒ QUE DESITGEU

BLAU NAVAL HOPES THAT "TIÓ" HAS TAKEN THE DESIRED

dissabte, 24 de desembre de 2011

divendres, 23 de desembre de 2011

US Navy receives LPD 22 from HII*



The landing platform dock 17, San Antonio Class, is the latest class of amphibious force ship for the United States Navy. The mission of the San Antonio class is to transport the US Marine Corps "mobility triad" – that is, advanced amphibious assault vehicles (AAAVs), air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC) and the MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft – to trouble spots around the world. 

Construction of the first ship of 12, the San Antonio (LPD 17), began in June 2000. The ship's keel was laid in December 2000. It was launched in July 2003 and commissioned in January 2006. The San Antonio is homeported at Norfolk naval base, Virginia. The vessel achieved initial operating capability (IOC) in May 2008 and made its first deployment in August 2008 as part of the Iwo Jima expeditionary strike group.

The keel of the second ship, New Orleans (LPD 18), was laid in October 2002. It was launched in November 2004, delivered in December 2006 and commissioned in March 2007. The keel of the third, Mesa Verde (LPD 19), was laid in February 2003, launched in January 2005 and commissioned in December 2007.

The keel for the fourth, USS Green Bay (LPD 20), was laid in August 2003, launched in August 2006 and delivered in August 2008. It was commissioned in January 2009. New Orleans and Green Bay are homeported at San Diego.

The keel for USS New York (LPD 21) was laid in September 2004. It was launched in December 2007 and commissioned in November 2009. Construction of USS New York included 24t of steel salvaged from the wreckage of the World Trade Center, as a memorial to those who lost their lives in New York on 11 September 2001.



Other contracted vessels are the San Diego (LPD 22), Anchorage (LPD 23), Arlington (LPD 24), Somerset (LPD 25) and Murtha (LPD 26). The keel of San Diego was laid in May 2007 and launched in May 2010 for commissioning in 2011. Arlington's keel was laid in May 2008 and launched in November 2010. The Keel of Anchorage was laid in September 2007 and launched in February 2011.
The last ship is scheduled for delivery by 2012. The ships are to replace the functions of the LPD 4, LSD 36, LKA 113 and LST 1179 classes of amphibious ships.

In December 1996 the US Navy awarded a contract to an industrial alliance led by Northrop Grumman Ship Systems (formerly Litton Avondale), with General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, Raytheon Electronic Systems and Intergraph Corporation, to design and construct the first of an anticipated 12 ships under the navy's LPD 17 programme. It was planned that Avondale would build eight and Bath Iron Works four ships.

However, in June 2002, the US Navy signed an MoU with Northrop Grumman and Bath Iron Works, making Northrop Grumman responsible for the construction of all San Antonio Class vessels, while Bath is the builder of four Arleigh Burke destroyers, previously assigned to Northrop Grumman.
Design
The ship is constructed from steel and designed to minimise radar cross section. Enhanced survivability features include improved fragmentation and nuclear blast protection and shock-hardened structure. Automation and integration of systems has enabled a significant reduction in crew, projected to be 361.
The ship provides three vehicle decks of 25,402ft² and two cargo holds with 25,548ft³ for bulk cargo and ammunition magazines in addition to 1,234m³ for cargo fuel. 



Accommodation is provided for two LCAC (landing craft air cushioned), 700 troops and 14 new AAAVs. Each LCAC is capable of carrying 60t of cargo and vehicles, including the M1A2 Abrams tank, at speeds of up to 40kt. 

The ship's advanced enclosed mast / sensor (AEM/S) system consists of two large eight-sided structures, which house the radar and communications antennae with a hybrid frequency-selective surface. As well as reducing the ship's radar cross section, the AEM/S system also protects the equipment from exposure to the elements.
Aircraft
At the stern of the ship the landing deck is able to accommodate two Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters, six Bell AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters, four Boeing CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters or two Boeing Bell MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft.

The hangar deck provides aviation maintenance facilities and is sufficiently large to accommodate one Sea Stallion, two Sea Knight, three Super Cobra helicopters or one MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. The hangar doors are constructed by Indal Technologies. Each blast-resistant door weighs 18,000kg and has three horizontal folding panels.

USS San Antonio began flight operations testing with the V-22 Osprey tiltrotor and CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter in June 2006.
Weapon systems
Two mk31 mod 0 launchers are capable of launching the fire-and-forget Raytheon rolling airframe missile (RAM). The RAM (RIM 116) surface-to-air missile has dual-mode radio frequency / infrared guidance and is designed to engage anti-ship missiles. It has a range of 8km. Space and weight provision has been made for the future fitting of a vertical launcher for the evolved Seasparrow missile (ESSM) if required.

The ship is equipped with two mk46 mod 1 30mm guns for close-in surface self-defence. The mk46 is a dual-axis stabilised chain gun with a firing rate of up to 250 rounds a minute. The fire director includes a thermal imager, low-light TV camera and laser rangefinder, with a closed-loop tracking system.

The gun can be operated locally at the gun turret or remotely in the combat information centre. Additional armament includes two mk26 mod 18 50-calibre machine guns.


SSDS (ship self-defence system)
San Antonio is one of the classes of vessels planned to receive the SSDS (ship self-defence system) mk2 being developed by Raytheon for the US Navy. SSDS will be an integration of all the ship's self-defence systems and will include multi-function radar, advanced integrated electronic warfare system and infrared search and track system (IRST).

LPD 22, the sixth of the class, is scheduled to be the first ship to receive the complete system, which will be retrofitted to the rest of the class. SSDS is also to be fitted to the US Navy projected new carriers (CVN 76) and destroyers (DD-X).

The ship is equipped with a fibre-optic shipboard wide area network (SWAN) from Raytheon, which connects ship systems, sensors and combat systems to the ship’s command consoles.

In February 2004, Harris Corporation was awarded a contract to provide high-frequency (HF) radio broadband communications systems for the San Antonio Class.
Countermeasures
The ship is equipped with the AN/SLQ-25A Nixie towed decoy system, from Argon ST of Fairfax, Virginia, and the mk53 Nulka decoy launching system, developed by the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation in Canberra and Lockheed Martin Sippican in Massachusetts.

Nulka is a hovering rocket system, which seduces incoming missiles away from the ship.
The Raytheon AN/SLQ-32A (V) 2 ESM (electronic support measures) system is a detection and jamming system which provides surveillance, warning and electronic countermeasures against missile attack.
LPD 22 and later vessels will be fitted with the advanced integrated electronic warfare system (AIEWS).
Sensors
The ship's radars include: ITT AN/SPS-48E three-dimensional air search radar operating at C/D band, Lockheed Martin AN/APQ-9B surface surveillance and tracking radar operating at I band, Raytheon AN/SPS-64(V)9 navigation radar operating at I band and two Northrop Grumman Norden Systems AN/SPS-73 surface search radar operating at I-band.
Propulsion
The ship is powered by four Colt-Pielstick 2.5 STC diesel engines developing 10,400hp each. The main reduction gears from Philadelphia Gear Corp turn two shafts with Bird Johnson controllable pitch propellers. A new high-power "low-drag" propeller hub design provides improved propeller efficiency.

The ship's electrical power is provided by five 2,500kW Caterpillar ship service diesel generators (SSDG), with self-cleaning strainers and filters and electric pumps. Seven 200t York air-conditioning units are fitted for cooling of systems and habitation. The ship auxiliary systems are all electric, including electric heating, electric water heaters and a 72,000gpd reverse osmosis water-generating plant.

* En motiu de l'entrega de la setena unitat de la classe San Antonio (LPD 17), us oferim la fitxa tècnica publicada a Naval Tecnology. 


Indian Navy developing new trimaran stealth frigates*



The Indian naval designers have been working on cutting edge ships of the future. CNN-IBN caught up with naval experts at the President's Fleet Review to find out what the Indian navy fleet will look like, 10 years from now. The Indian Navy will have a three hulled ship or the Trimaran virtually invisible to the enemy radar because of its stealth design. Its deck gun and missiles have been concealed in every respect.

KN Vaidyanathan, DG, Naval Design, said, "Stealth means reduced radar cross section, reduced underwater noise as well as reduced infrared signature apart from other electric signatures."

"We are also going to use multi-function radars, already our destroyers and new gen frigates are going to have multi-function radars and they are using the vertical launch systems," he added.

The Trimaran concept design follows in the wake of the Navy's first stealth design, the Project 17 Shivalik class ships, two of which are now at sea with a third on the way. 

But the Navy is banking on the Shivalik's successor, the Project 17 Alfa stealth vessel, which will have missile silos flush with the deck and torpedo launchers blending along the sides of the vessel. There will also be a concealed hangar for a Kamov helicopter. Naval designers admit that US concepts have influenced some of their ideas.

"If you look at the LCS design of the US Navy, they are moving on the seaframe concept and mission modularity.The idea is to have a basic seaframe for the platform and have a mission module so that you can have role changes for the ship and there can be a quick turnaround of roles," Vaidyanathan said.

With an eye on the future, the Navy is moving towards modular construction and may even participate in Britain's Global Combat Ship project where individual navies can use a common low cost platform to fit their own weapons and systems. 

From: CNN/IBN 

* Notícia publicada al lloc web Navy Recognition. A banda de les properes incorporacions de l'Indian Navy, també volem fervos esment de futurs dissenys. L'Índia és un país amb una història naval immensa, i amb unes potencialitats encara més grans.

dijous, 22 de desembre de 2011

York completes a week shadowing Russia’s biggest warship around the British Isles*

20 December 2011
HMS York has returned to Portsmouth after spending the past week shadowing the activities of Russia’s biggest warship, the Admiral Kuznetsov, around the British Isles.
The destroyer observed the movements of the carrier and her task group of half a dozen escorts and support vessels off Scotland and the west coast of Ireland, where the Kuznetsov conducted flying operations with her Su-33 Flanker jets.



COMING in to land on the deck of the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov is a Sukhoi Su-33 Flanker jet under the watchful eyes of a Russian Helix helicopter – and HMS York.
The Portsmouth-based destroyer has spent a week shadowing and observing Russia’s biggest warship and her task group as she made her way around the British Isles.
York was alerted as the Fleet Ready Escort – the on-call frigate or destroyer which responds to events at short notice – earlier this month and greeted the Kuznetsov task group, northeast of the Orkneys, on December 12.
It’s the first time the 55,000-tonne leviathan has deployed near UK waters in a number of years and she elected to take shelter from the winter weather in international waters off the Moray Firth for four days.



When the weather finally abated, the carrier group – the Kuznetsov plus one destroyer, a frigate, three tankers and an ocean-going tug – sailed around the top of Scotland and into the Atlantic past western Ireland, conducting flying operations when weather permitted with her Mach 2 Flankers and Helix helicopters in international airspace.
All the time the Kuznetsov, named after a wartime Soviet naval leader, has been under the gaze of HMS York.


“As the Fleet Ready Escort, York has maintained a watch on the Russian task group, demonstrating clearly the Royal Navy's presence and conducting our routine business around what are our home waters,” said York’s Commanding Officer Cdr Rex Cox.
“We are well-practised in this type of operation and are ready to position anywhere around the UK and provide appropriate presence when called upon.
“My ship’s company have put in a cracking effort in some pretty challenging weather conditions and are now looking forward to some well-deserved Christmas leave and time with their families.”
With the Russian task group continuing south and away from UK home waters, the Type 42 has returned home to Portsmouth.

* Notícia publicada al lloc web de la Royal Navy. Hem cregut convenient compartir aquesta notícia, per tal de realitzar un seguiment del desplegament rus en motiu de la crisi de Síria.

MiG-29K gets on board Indian aircraft carrier*

With work on the Indian navy's future aircraft carrier the INS Vikramaditya now 90% complete, an RSK MiG-29K fighter has been placed aboard the vessel for the first time.
Pictured on the carrier's deck at the Sevmash dockyard in Severodvinsk, northern Russia during November, aircraft Side 311 was deployed using a crane to serve as a mock-up only.
According to Sevmash, the Vikramaditya will start sea trials in May 2012, with these to involve take-offs and landings using two industry-owned aircraft. One is a purpose-built MiG-29K, while the other is a MiG-35D two-seat demonstrator now being modified after the crash of a MiG-29KUB trainer during trials in 2011.


indian navy mig-29k, vladamir karnozov
 © Vladamir Karnozov

Originally introduced to service with the Russian navy in 1987 as the Baku, but deactivated in 1992, the modified Vikramaditya now features a "ski-jump" ramp and three arrestor wires to support fighter operations. New Delhi's total investment in the ship is worth around $2 billion, with Sevmash expecting it to be commissioned into service on 4 December 2012 - Indian navy day.
Russia has so far delivered 11 of the 16 MiG-29K/KUBs ordered for the Indian navy under a 2003 deal worth $530 million, with the remainder due to be shipped to Goa before the end of 2011.
India also this year firmed up an option for 29 more navalised MiG-29s to equip its future homegrown aircraft carriers.

* Notícia publicada a Flight Global. La renovació i ampliació de l'esquadra de portaavions índia, com l'arma submarina, és un dels elements clau per entendre el poder creixent d'aquest país.